



Version of attached ﬁle:
Published Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Not peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Uckelman, Sara L. (2017) 'Book review of Ana Mara Mora-Marquez, 'The thirteenth-century notion of
signiﬁcation : the discussions and their origin and development.' (Investigating medieval philosophy 10.) Leiden
and Boston : Brill, 2015. Pp. 256. 142.ISBN : 978− 900− 429867− 5.′, Speculum., 92(4).pp.1223− 1225.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://doi.org/10.1086/693663
Publisher's copyright statement:
c© 2017 by the Medieval Academy of America.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
Ana María Mora-Márquez, The Thirteenth-Century Notion of Signiﬁcation: The Dis-
cussions and Their Origin and Development. (Investigating Medieval Philosophy 10.)
Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2015. Pp. 256. $142. ISBN: 978-900-429867-5.
doi:10.1086/693663
In this slim, dense, and heavily text-based book, Mora-Márquez traces the development of
the semantic notion of “signiﬁcation” (signiﬁcatio) from its origins in two distinct Greek
philosophical conceptions, semeion and symbolon, into a uniquely medieval concept. Be-
cause medieval philosophers drew from both logical and grammatical traditions when dis-
cussing signiﬁcation, there is no uniﬁed conception of the notion that holds across the entire
thirteenth century or in all relevant disciplines. Mora-Márquez teases out the differences,
explains how they relate to each other, and identiﬁes the roots of the differences. Due to
the complexity of the material, the book requires careful thought and attention in order
to grasp all the subtle nuances in the ancient and medieval views.
The main argument is that over the thirteenth century two opposing ancient views of sig-
niﬁcation, rooted in the logical tradition of signiﬁcation based on Boethius, and ultimately
Aristotle; and the grammatical tradition of signiﬁcation, based on Priscian, were developed
into a single coherent concept. The coherence was eventually obtained by limiting the use of
the concept in logic and grammar and highlighting its use in simple linguistic institution. By
the end of the thirteenth century, signiﬁcation played a central role in the institution of lin-
guistic signs, and almost none in logical and grammatical accounts.
The book is divided into two parts. Part 1 is on “Signiﬁcation of Concepts and Signiﬁ-
cation of Things” and considers the question of what it is that words signify. Part 2, “Sig-
niﬁcation in Logic and in Grammar,” looks at applications of signiﬁcation. Bookending
these are an introduction, a conclusion, a list of abbreviations, a bibliography (unedited pri-
mary texts; edited primary texts; and secondary texts), and indices (of subjects; modern au-
thors; and ancient and medieval authors). Primary sources in Latin and Greek are trans-
lated into English by Mora-Márquez, with the originals in footnotes (which also contain
comprehensive references to relevant contemporary secondary discussions). The transla-
tions occasionally incorporate infelicities, such as the use of “she” as the generic pronoun;
while this may have become commonplace in contemporary philosophical literature, it is
anachronistic to impose modern linguistic gender norms on medieval sources, particularly
sources written in a gendered language where changing “he” to “she” makes the transla-
tion unfaithful. Additionally, while all primary sources inGreek and Latin are translated, sec-
ondary sources in other languages, such as French, are not.
In chapter 1 Mora-Márquez argues that Aristotle’s theory of meaning in Perihermeneias
is aimed at identifying the grounds for assigning truth or falsity to assertions, and in par-
ticular, when one assertion is contradicted by another; and that the dialectical context is
essential to understanding the theory. Because the focus is on how one can convey informa-
tion by means of assertions, it is the truth values of assertions (that is, asserted sentences)
rather than the truth value of (unasserted) sentences that is important, rather than how we
are able to create truthful linguistic representations. Signiﬁcation is central to conveying in-
formation because of the connection between signiﬁcation and “being a sign of.” In order
for something to be a sign of something, it must be a sign for someone, that is, one must
have a particular person to whom the information is being conveyed. Boethius inherited
this approach to language from Aristotle but was also inﬂuenced by Porphyry, who, in con-
trast, was interested in how we are able to obtain truthful linguistic representations.
This mixed inheritance provides the foundation for the medieval discussions, two of
which are chosen in chapter 2 as representative and illustrative of different problems asso-
ciated with the concept of signiﬁcation. The ﬁrst question is whether words signify concepts
or things. Martin of Dacia and Peter Auvergne argued, contra Boethius, that names are im-
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posed on and signify concepts, as opposed to things; they were contradicted by Robert Kil-
wardby (on the grounds that because words do not signify naturally, they cannot have sig-
niﬁcation by imposition) and Albert the Great (on the grounds that since we cannot have
cognitive access to essences, we cannot impose words directly on them). The second ques-
tion, whether words lose their signiﬁcation upon the destruction of their signiﬁcate, is in-
vestigated through the sophism sentence “Omnis homo de necessitate est animal” (Every
man of necessity is an animal), abbreviated OHNEA. The question is whether this sentence
is true when there are no men, and in section 2.2, Mora-Márquez identiﬁes four ways in
which this question can be answered: (1) When there are no men, homo loses its signiﬁca-
tion, and OHNEA is neither true nor false. (2) The signiﬁcation is not lost, and OHNEA is
false. (3) The signiﬁcation is not false, and OHNEA is true in one sense but false in another
(via a distinction between actual being and dispositional or habitual being). (4) The signi-
ﬁcation is not lost, and OHNEA is true. The answers given by Roger Bacon, Boethius of
Dacia, Peter John Olivi, and the author of theAnonymous Alani cumulatively provide wit-
nesses for all four types of answers.
The second half of the book turns to the different ways in which the notion of signiﬁca-
tion is used in grammatical and logical contexts. In chapter 3, we are introduced to the dif-
ferent deﬁnitions of “name” (5 “noun”) and “verb” in the logical tradition of Aristotle and
in the grammatical tradition of Priscian. Aristotle’s deﬁnitions pick out “the features that
allow words to bring about assertions that are susceptible of truth and falsity,” while Pri-
scian aimed at determining “the features that allow words to be divided into different gram-
matical categories” (121). In the ﬁnal chapter, Mora-Márquez presents the view of the late
thirteenth-century modist grammarians, who argued that the way in which a word signiﬁes
(its mode of signiﬁcation) is what gives it the part of speech that it has. This can be contrasted
with the nonmodist approach of the logicians, who over the course of the thirteenth century
followed Aristotle’s focus on the ways in which sentences can be used to make assertions and
contradictions, and shifted from the question of how language can represent reality (that is,
questions of when and how sentences are true and false) to questions of argumentativemethod
(that is, when two assertions are contradictory).
In the conclusion, Mora-Márquez argues that the ultimate goal of a coherent notion of
signiﬁcation that could be used to justify both logic and grammar as scientiﬁc disciplines
resulted in an increasing narrowing of the concept until it was no longer closely connected
to either discipline. Modist grammar, whose heights were reached in the 1260s and 1270s,
had almost entirely disappeared by the end of the century. Logic, too, was infected by the
rampant nominalism that was in place by the end of the century, and in such an ontolog-
ically austere setting, it is not clear what role signiﬁcation can play.
The book suffers occasionally from some nonstandard English and a lack of uniformity
of vocabulary. For example, on one page “communicational” is found used for exactly the
same concept as “communicative” (a preferable choice), which is used on the next page.
Similarly, in section 2.1, “stand for” and “signify” are apparently used as synonyms; given
that the former is often used as a translation of suppositio rather than signiﬁcatio, this is
confusing for anyone familiar with thirteenth-century semantic vocabulary. Elsewhere (119–
20) what had previously been called “verbs” are called “attributes”without the change in ter-
minology being explicitly pointed out. Finally, the awkward “datation” occurs in footnote 37
(140), where “dating” would be more natural. However, I found only two typos, one in foot-
note 117 (“volontary” for “voluntary”), and another that probably only I would notice, as my
name is misspelled in the acknowledgments.
The primary audience of the book is specialists in medieval logic and philosophy of lan-
guage, and those lacking this background will likely ﬁnd the book hard going. But for the
specialist, it is a phenomenal resource, meticulously researched, interesting in content, and
ﬁlling a very important gap in our understanding of semantic theory in the thirteenth cen-
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tury. Now, all we need, as Mora-Márquez points out, is someone to write the fourteenth-
century sequel!
Sara L. Uckelman, Durham University
Lawrence Nees, Perspectives on Early Islamic Art in Jerusalem. (Arts and Archaeology of
the Islamic World 5.) Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2015. Pp. xvii, 242; many color ﬁgures.
$179. ISBN: 978-90-04-30176-4.
doi:10.1086/693690
The Dome of the Rock sits atop one of the most richly symbolic sites of human occupation—
a place known to Jews as the Temple Mount, where Solomon was believed to have built his
shrine; and to Muslims as the Haram al-Sharif, or the Noble Sanctuary. The location’s his-
torical and archaeological stratigraphy is as substantial as it is contested, having witnessed
both moments of violent destruction and periods of signiﬁcant patronage from prehistoric
times to the current day. Lawrence Nees’s Perspectives on Early Islamic Art in Jerusalem fo-
cuses on this patch of the city in the seventh century, at the moment when it took on many of
the features still recognizable today. To specialists both in medieval and Islamic art, the au-
thor’s background as an early Western medievalist might at ﬁrst cause some surprise. In his
introduction (chapter 1), Nees explicitly acknowledges his outsider status, making clear that
his intent is to “pose some unexpected and provocative but also fruitful questions” (4).
Nees presents a series of case studies addressing problematic or overlooked issues con-
cerning the area’s earliest Islamic constructions. In chapter 2 (“The Earliest Mosque in Je-
rusalem”), Nees argues that the Haram itself was the ﬁrst major place of prayer in the city
and focuses speciﬁcally on an now-empty zone on the eastern side of the platform. Chap-
ter 3 (“The Problem of ‘Arculf’ and the Earliest Mosque in Jerusalem”) dismantles an early
eighth-century European pilgrimage account about the site, De locis sanctis by Adomnan,
abbot of Iona, which purports to be the eyewitness testimony of a certain “Arculf.” Nees
evaluates the text’s historic veracity in describing the original size and location of this
mosque and ultimately recognizes the text’s literary valences and exegetical messages over
its documentary value. Chapter 4 (“The Dome of the Chain: An Essay in Interpretation”)
turns to the small, open-air octagonal structure ﬂanking the Dome of the Rock. Nees notes
that there has been no dedicated study of this monument to date, a surprising fact given its
charged location and evidently early Islamic dating. He offers an iconographic evaluation
of the architectural features of the monument, particularly the arrangement of its spoliated
Roman columns and capitals, to posit the structure’s use as a royal enclosure. In chapter 5
(“The Columns and Eagle Capitals in the Dome of the Rock”), Nees studies ﬁgural capitals
at the Dome of the Rock, which have also largely escaped scholarly consideration. He con-
nects the iconography of the capitals to Byzantine and Umayyad artifacts depicting birds in
various media to argue for the capitals’ “metaphoric or symbolic signiﬁcance” (125) and
imperial connotations. Nees raises questions about the use of ﬁgural imagery in an Islamic
religious space and considers whether the capitals’ placement suggests ritualistic activities
on the Haram.
Chapter 6 (“Conclusion: Crossing Borders”) outlines many of the challenges facing schol-
ars interested in early Islamic visual or material culture. Nees argues that art historical schol-
arship on the period will beneﬁt from more encompassing approaches that look across dis-
ciplinary divides to address the overlaps and shared practices among the period’s various
confessional and linguistic communities. Nees rightfully describes the practical hurdles in
working in this area of art history, including the ﬁeld’s small number of practitioners, polit-
ical impediments to excavation at the sacred site, conﬂicting historical sources, and poorly
documented archaeological remains. That few scholars have ever addressed the Dome of
Reviews 1225
Speculum 92/4 (October 2017)
This content downloaded from 129.234.039.105 on November 02, 2017 03:43:41 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
